Referendum, what is it all about?
There is a lot of wishful thinking when it comes to looking for successes for sustainable transport in cities.
The following article was written in 1992 for publication in
Eastern European environmental magazines. It describes the
Amsterdam traffic referendum of March 1992 and the attitude
of the environmental groups and their opponents. (Source: www.dds.nl/~pba/gopher/whatref.txt)
Anti-car demonstrators blocked automobile traffic
in Amsterdam's historic Damrak area June 26th, in protest against
signs that the city government was backing away from an
ambitious car reduction plan. Demonstrators used a blow-torch
to cut a car in half, symbolizing the plan to cut auto use by half.
The plan which won the support of 53% of voters in a
March 1992 referendum, calls on the city government to halve
automobile traffic and parking spaces in Amsterdam's heart by
the year 2002. It also provides for auto-free streets, bike lanes,
enlarged pedestrian walks, an 18-mph automobile speed limit,
$2.25 parking meter fees, and $70 parking violation fines.
The Netherlands has pioneered auto-reduction efforts
with such cities as Delft, Groningen, and Amsterdam
spearheading traffic banning and calming measures. According
to Amsterdam's auto-free group, Platform for a Car-Free Inner
City, the government has hinted it might renege on the 50% cut.
One leading City Council member who oversees transportation
matters recently declared that the plan's goals would be too harsh
on motorists. (Auto-Free Press, Sept/Oct 93)
Success and failure of Amsterdam traffic referendum
The closer you get to the Dutch capital, the more likely you
are to hear derisory remarks about the Amsterdam car
referendum held last spring. For some reason mainly
intellectuals and media took a condescending position towards
the plebiscite from the start. The disappointingly low
turnout at the ballotbox added to this. But in spite of the
low turnout City Council decided to recognize the outcome:
much less space for cars. The action committee that has
fought from the beginning to get as many people as possible
to vote against cars still considers it has scored a victory.
The situation in Amsterdam is unique. Here you have an old
inner city that dates largely from the golden seventeenth
century but was never damaged by invasions or bombardments.
In this part of the city with its canals and small streets
about eighty thousand people work and live. So unlike in many
other cities the referendum area was not the rather small
shopping district where hardly anybody lives, but a real,
living and important part of the town.
ACCIDENTS
The decision to hold a referendum about cars was not actuated
by environmental considerations, but developed rather
accidentally out of a specific political situation. A
relatively low turnout at local elections and bad results for
the traditionally strongest party, the Social Democrats, led
to this 'experiment'. When called upon by city government to
send in suggestions for a topic to put to a poll of the
people, many citizens proposed 'the automobile' as a subject,
more specifically cars as a nuisance.
In this flat country every inhabitant owns at least one
bicycle, 65 percent of all individual displacements in the
city are effected by bicycle, on foot or by public transport.
Still, in Amsterdam parked or moving cars take up one third
of street space. In the narrow inner city streets traffic
participants wage a daily war for scarse public space. But
the strongest minority wins, to the detriment of weaker
groups like the elderly, children and cyclists. A sad
illustration are the 42 people killed and 3.265 wounded in
1990, most of which were cyclists or pedestrians, who have
lost out in the confrontation with evermore agressive
cardrivers.
From the start, the proposal to hold a plebiscite met with
fierce opposition. Powerful city center shop owners went to
court to try and ban the whole experiment. They feared a drop
in turnover if costumers were inhibited to use their cars to
drive and buy, notwithstanding surveys showing that only
twenty percent of the buyers use their cars to shop. Eight in
ten come in on foot, use their bicycle, or take public
transport (tram) that can pride itself on a dense network,
especially in the inner city.
INVOLVEMENT
Of course the shopkeepers lost their case in court. The
judges' decision was the starting point of a short, but
rather heated three month campaign. According to a recent
report by two bureaus for statistical investigation the
referendum drew the attention of many people that are
normally not interested in city politics. They started
reading publications or went to one or more meetings and
developed their own opinion on the subject. That the turnout
on March 25 was to be only over 27 percent, much lower than
the predicted over sixty, had other reasons and was partly
due to the lack of clarity of the wording of the question put
to the vote and the not very neutralist interventions by pro
car politicians.
From the start, several traffic action groups actively
involved themselves. These included the Real Dutch Cyclist
Union (ENFB), Stop Child Murder, Friends of the Earth,
Amsterdam Ecology Centre and others. They formed a Platform
for an Inner City Without Cars and pleaded with the city
government to simplify the question to be put to the vote.
Either you go on like before, by implementing measures that
can only try to curb the explosive autonomous growth of car
use, without solving the underlying problem. Or you opt for a
city where in the first decade of next century the car will
be the exception, only used by those that can't do without.
Like people with a handicap, police, fire-brigade, and other
indispensable services.
Ultimately the choice put before the citizens was much less
clear. Option A signified continuation of current policies,
which according to some politicians in itself would lead to a
slowdown in growth of car use. Option B should lead to a
reduction of space for cars by half within ten years. This
reduction of space was mainly defined as a reduction of
parking space. Illegal parkings should disappear. Of the
23.000 official parking places only 11.500 should stay in use
after the year 2002.
Many consequences of both choices were not clearly defined.
Still the Platform for a Carfree Amsterdam decided to involve
itself in the campaign. 'If we would not have done this, the
referendum would have become an absolute failure, I'm sure',
now states Wijnand Duijvendak, who coordinated the work of
the Platform during the three month campaign. The Platform's
campaign was financed by private donations and partly by
subsidies from city government.
CHILDREN
The Platform opted for a positive approach in its campaign:
to stress the gains an inner city with much less cars would
bring to the majority of its users and inhabitants. Its four
slogans, in leaflets as well as on prettily coloured
wallposters all over the city, reflected this positive
outlook: fewer cars means more space, more safety, more air
and much greater accessibility for most inner city users.
The central aim of the campaign would be to mobilize
potential supporters, rather than trying to convert confirmed
car drivers. From the beginning polls showed a significant
majority for B - less cars. The Platform's aim would be to
keep them on its side and argue the absolute need to turn out
on referendum day.
In its campaign the Platforms strived to bring to the
forefront the weaker participants in traffic, like the
elderly, children and cyclists. Among other things this
resulted in a childrens' referendum. In it over seventy
percent of 1250 pupils from sixteen primary schools voted for
option B. This got extensive coverage from national and local
media. Because the campaign was short, ideas for involving
the elderly, for instance by organizing a similar referendum
in elderly homes, could not be put into practice.
Once their strategy to have the referendum banned had failed,
the biggest promotors of the use of cars started their own
campaign. These included the Chamber of Commerce, backed by
the local trade union central and a committee of local
individuals under the selfevident name 'Residents and
companies want to park their car'.
Their message: vote for A, roughly the continuation of
existing policies. Interestingly, they never questioned the
positive effects of much less car traffic on air pollution,
traffic casualties and general atmosfere. They decided to
paint a grim image of B: Less cars would lead to an
economically dying museum city, where unemployment would rise
by the loss of twenty thousand jobs, investment would decline
and unhappy people would be condemned to travel in
overcrowded trams.
SMALL SCALE
The Platform struck back with reports that showed that talk
about loss of employment and investors was just a red
herring. Examples like the town of Groningen in the north of
the Netherlands showed that stricter traffic restraints lead
to a small drop in the turnover of local shopkeepers and
catering for a short period only, but that these quickly go
back to normal. German experience shows a more vital economy
in cities stimulating public transport and curbing car
traffic. As said above, only twenty percent of Amsterdam
shoppers come by car. A survey showed that of these, another
63 percent would still come to the inner city but use public
transport if B was to be adopted. A more attractive climate
would, at the same time, draw more public to inner city
shops, so the general effect on profits might as well be
rather positive.
Access to the Amsterdam inner city at the moment is mostly
threatened by continuous traffic jams. Reduction of cars in
line with option B would eventually lead to more space for
economically essential traffic. Most companies absolutely
depending on rapid access by car already left the city a long
time ago, because of traffic congestion. Maybe a few more
would leave, but their place would quickly be taken by many
of the small scale enterprises that form the natural heart of
economic life in inner cities.
The Platform tried to divide its opponents by solliciting
signatures from city companies sympathizing with its goals.
Some trade union members wrote letters to their national
secretaries, complaining that local union centrals views went
against national positions on traffic policies taken before.
As a result, the local traffic workers union distanced itself
from the 'A-campaign'.
PARKING
A difficult issue is cars belonging to residents of the inner
city. The official wording of option B only stated 'much less
space for cars', a provisional scenario explained this would
mean a reduction of parking space by half within ten years.
At this moment over eight thousand residents of the inner city
own a car. The Platform proposed to let these people keep
their parking permits, but refuse such a permit to newcomers.
In this way car owning in the inner city would eventually
fade away. This would be a more just solution than making
parking space more expensive by relying on market mechanisms
and thereby turning parking into an exclusive provision for
the well-to-do.
Because the consequences of option B were unclear, a lot of
arguments became mixed up in the weeks leading up to the
referendum. In a grim polarisation, protagonists accused each
other of mispresenting the choice to the voters. The
Council's Finance Committee Chairman, belonging to the
minority right wing liberal party, who was against car
banning measures from the beginning, added to the confusion
by stating that the city would not be able to finance the
implementation of option B.
Election day finally came, polls had predicted a turnout of
around sixty percent and a victory for B. The latter proved
to be true, the former turned out to be much lower. Only
27.68 percent of the voters went to the ballot box, 52.96
percent chose B, 45.64 percent voted for A. Participation was
highest in the inner city and bordering neighbourhoods.
That same night the main political parties announced they
would respect the outcome. The City Council had never set a
minimum turnout as a criterion for judging representativity.
In countries with more experience in direct democracy like
Switzerland, a plebiscite is usually considered a succes if
at least half the population turns up that voted at the last
local election. In Amsterdam this was the case.
DEMOCRACY
On hearing the politicians' announcement in the hot local
television studio the Platform cheered its victory, while
representatives of the Chamber of Commerce wondered how this
could have happened.
Afterwards, much has been said about succes or failure. From
the beginning the Platform had criticized the City Councils
set-up, in which consequences of both options were not very
clear. Many citizens distrusted the intentions of city
politicians, owing to their overt interventions in
undermining the status of the referendum. According to an
already mentioned survey, to be published in September 1992,
sixty percent intended to vote, but most of them changed
their mind out of distrust. The fact that from the beginning
the council refused to state that it would respect the
outcome was decisive in this, says the survey. Even now,
after the City Council have officially announced they will
start working towards a city with much less cars, only
eightteen percent of the Amsterdam population believes this.
At the same time, a large majority of the population remains
in favour of continuing to use the referendum as a means of
direct democracy.
The Platform's former coordinator Wijnand Duijvendak also
remains sceptical about City Hall's intentions. 'We never
thought the referendum would end the discussion. We saw it as
an important moment to talk traffic policies with larger
groups of citizens. If we had lost, the discussion would have
been closed for the next five, possibly ten years. But we
never thought the referendum in itself would automatically
lead to a radical change in policies. We will have to
continue to exert pressure on the City government, by direct
action if need be.'
POSTPONEMENT
The first documents produced since March, are not very
encouraging. Essentially, the proposals boil down to
intensifying implementation of existing legislation, for
instance against illegal parking by cars and installing some
more parking racks for bicycles. Also City Council is
considering proposals to shut down one shopping street to car
traffic on Saturdays. All the more far-reaching interventions
in traffic policies are to be postponed until after the next
local elections in 1994.
At this speed, Amsterdam might well end up in last place
behind those world cities looking for solutions to
insupportable car pressures. While German cities like Lubeck,
Aix-la-Chapelle and Saarbrucken and Zurich in Switzerland
score astonishing results by limiting traffic speed to
thirty, reducing road space and limiting access to cars and
promoting public transport, in Amsterdam day to day struggles
over public space continue, between cars on the one hand, and
cyclists, pedestrians and public transport on the other. Yet,
in 250 streets with a total lenght of about 240 kilometers
traffic noise exceeds legal norms, in one fifth of these
streets combined with air pollution well over the
government's allowed maximum. Without intervention, car
traffic in and around Amsterdam may well double between now
and 2005, says a recent traffic report commissioned by a
regional body of twenty cities including Amsterdam itself.
One thing the action groups have won however, says
Duijvendak. 'Many hundreds of people from all layers of the
population volunteered to be active in our campaign. If
necessary, we will call upon them. As a group, we have proven
our credibility and the strength of our argumentation. We are
developing more contacts with active people in neighbourhoods
inside and just around the inner city. A car might be a
wonderful thing for the individual driver, for the city as a
whole it proves to be a nightmare. If we do nothing, that
nightmare will just get worse.'
Harrie Lindelauff
harrieli@dds.hacktic.nl
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