The Famous Zurich U-Bahn
The first efforts to establish a tramway network in Zurich date back to the year 1864, when several railroad companies tried to start operations. In 1881 the communities of Zurich, Enge, Riesbach and Aussersihl organised a joint venture to establish a horse or steam tramway service. One year later the joint-stock company "Aktiengesellschaft der Zürcher Strassenbahn" was founded and three standard-gauge horse railway lines were built with London Meston & Cie. as general contractor. All three lines were opened to the public in 1882.
The "Elektrische Strassenbahn Zürich" (ESB) company, established in 1893 started serving the higher-lying suburbs of Zurich using metre-gauge electric streetcars as had been done in the Vevey-Montreux-Chillon line.
The municipality of Zurich took over the tramway network of the ESB after the incorporation of several neighbouring communities in 1896 and established the first community tram network in Europe, operating as the Zurich City Tram Company (StStZ).The horse-drawn tramline also merged with StStZ in 1897 and was converted into a metre-gauge network in 1900. Many new tramway routes were built in the inner city area around the turn of the century and several private companies began to serve the outlying areas. For example, the "Zentrale Zürichbahn" company opened the Bellvue-Kirche Fluntern and Platte-Oberstrass routes in 1895 and the Rigiplatz-Seilbahn Rigiviertel route in 1901. The "Strassenbahn Zürich-Oerlikon-Seebach" followed by inaugurating streetcar service on the routes from Central to Oerlikon and Seebach, from Oerlikon to Schwamendingen and from Seebach to Glattbrugg. Other companies established new lines linking the industrial areas of Höngg, Dietikon and Albisgütli.
Numerous private companies merged with StStZ after the turn of the century. Many new lines were built in the 1920's which include the connections to the zoo and to Triemli, Wollishofen and Albisrieden. Unfortunately, some routes were taken out of service in the 1930's: these include the ZOS lines to Glattbrugg and Schwamen-dingen and the Schlieren-Weiningen section . The StStZ was renamed "Verkehrsbetriebe der Stadt Zürich" (VBZ) in 1950. Service on route 1 and the route from Farbhof to Schlieren was abandoned in 1954.
In the following years several subway projects failed to pass the plebiscite and were not realised due to the pre-eminence of the automobile. A new combination highway-tram tunnel in the Milchbuck area was opened in 1986. Because the platforms are located between the tracks, the trains run on the left-hand side, deviating from the remaining VBZ network. Hence . . . (Above taken from an official, unremembered local source.)
The increasing significance of private motorised transport has kept our cities locked in a vicious circle for years. The blocking of roads and the lack of car parks are being counteracted by the construction of new roads and car parks and the extension of existing ones. The result is that even the new roads are blocked and the lack of car parks becomes even greater. A city becomes more unattractive, and this evil is once again dealt with by the most obvious means: with the construction of new roads and car parks! The transport policy of the City of Zurich has broken this vicious circle and transformed it into a "rainbow", a symbol of environmental protection and economic strength (Figure 1). The overflow of private motor traffic was answered not by increasing but by redistributing the existing road area in favour of local public transport and pedestrians. The result is greater urbanity, better environmental conditions, increased economic strength (!) and stabilised private transport.
The transport policy of the Council of the City of Zurich has 4 objectives:
This transport policy is based on a recognition of the fact that, for physical reasons alone, it is not possible to make a city of half a million people accessible with the car. Car traffic takes up too much space, so that there is a danger that there will no longer be any city left after it has been adapted to meet the traffic needs. We are aware of similar examples from the USA..
In the interests of the economy, the quality of the environment and living and leisure standards, an above-average proportion of passenger journeys was assigned to public transport. An essential requirement for this is the provision of an attractive local public transport system and good conditions for pedestrians. Furthermore, because the individual citizen is not willing voluntarily to dispense with the use of his car despite a clear knowledge of the relationships, at the same time neither additional streets nor car parks were constructed. The objectives have been substantially achieved. A comparison of the distribution of journeys made over the various forms of transport shows that about twice as many journeys are made by public transport in Zurich than in comparative German cities; the proportion of journeys made by car is correspondingly smaller (Figure 2). The number of journeys per inhabitant per year still shows marked differences compared with other European cities (Figure 3).
If you ask the inhabitants of a town which transport policy should be followed, the citizens will not choose the car. They are much more intelligent than politicians and other opinion leaders believe and have higher values than merely standing still in a traffic jam.
The answer to the question as to how it was possible in Zurich to convince the citizens of the advantages of a transport policy which gives preference to public transport in the existing road system over private motor transport is as follows: Politicians and experts did not have to persuade the citizens. On the contrary, the citizens themselves initiated this transport policy through several referendums and a public campaign, in opposition to the will of politicians and experts. In Zurich, every public construction project which costs more than SFr. 10 million must be voted on by the public. As long as 20 years ago a phenomenon emerged which has been very clearly developed by Brög Sozialdata München, in the publication "Estimates of mobility in Europe" for the countries of the European Community:
The question of course does arise as to why the citizens of these countries do not behave in a corresponding manner. The difference between collective reason and individual reason is evident here: in a group, at a strategic level, the citizens are quite able to recognise the superior interest as their own interest and to decide accordingly - in questionnaires or in referendums. As an individual, when leaving the house early in the morning, only individual reason applies: a saving of 10 minutes or the greater convenience of using the car results in a decision in favour of this form of transport. Only when this has no immediate advantages (no available parking spaces, travelling time longer than with local public transport, more stress, etc.) owing to superior (individual decisions) does the attitude change, giving way to greater insight. No one would then seriously suggest replacing taxes with voluntary donations. We know very well that the fundamental (collective) view that taxes must be paid is not sufficient to overcome the short-term individual advantage of using the money for something "more intelligent".
The misjudgement of the citizens' opinion and the underestimation of the citizens' collective reason by politicians and experts was corrected in Zurich by the necessary referendum: the citizens rejected projects for new roads and multi-storey car parks and they refused investment credit for underground local public transport systems (underground tram, metro). On the other hand - contrary to the recommendation of the town council - they agreed with the public campaign which demanded giving priority to trams and buses in the existing road system and, by constructional and operational measures, ensuring that they are able to travel from stop to stop without delays, without interference from the car traffic and at the technically feasible speed (Figure 6).
The instrument of the referendum is very clearly responsible for the fact that transport policy in Zurich differs from that in towns where elected representatives of the public determine what happens. Brög (kleine Fibel) has an explanation for this phenomenon too: representatives of the citizens, politicians, are generally men aged between 20 and 60 and hence belong to that quarter of the population which uses the car to an above-average extent of 66% (average for all citizens 40%) and makes only 30% of journeys by public transport or bicycle or on foot (average for all citizens 49%) (Figure 7). Expressed more simply, the quarter of citizens who travel by car at above-average frequency also make the decisions and, because they use their own needs as a measure of the needs of all citizens, they decide in favour of car traffic.
The future of urban transport policy lies not in expansion but in the intelligent use of the existing traffic areas. The objective of ensuring mobility for people when travelling to work and shopping and during leisure time requires imaginative urban traffic management based on modern information technology.
In a city, there will always be a shortage of space for traffic owing to the apparently unstoppable growth of private motor traffic with its enormous need for space. The expansion of these traffic areas through the extension of roads and car parks or the construction of new ones is extremely expensive and takes place at the expense of economically useful areas or of open spaces and is therefore in competition with other basic values of the citizen. If the traffic areas cannot be expanded, the popular request is not fully met. Coming to terms with this problem without economic and ecological losses means urban traffic management. Figure 8 impressively shows the different space requirements of 240 people who travel to work or to the shops by various means of transport. A tram transports about 8000 people per hour on one track, and a bus about 4000. Ten and five tracks, respectively, are required for transporting the same number of people in cars. Trams or buses do not occupy parking spaces in the inner city. An employee who travels to work by car occupies twice the useful area there compared with someone who uses public transport: like himself, his car requires about 25 m².
These physical facts explain why the growth in road systems and the construction of car parks cannot solve the traffic problem in the city. Accessibility for employees and visitors can be ensured only when a decisive proportion uses space-saving public transport. If, as decided by referendum in Zurich, the citizens as taxpayers do not find it reasonable to replace the trams with expensive underground railways or find it more attractive if trams and buses travel through the urban streets in daylight in the interests of short walking distances, the high density of stops and high frequency in the timetables, the first requirement in the management of the valuable traffic area is the priority for public transport in the existing road network.
Numerous analyses of the hindrance of trams and buses indicate three technical/operational instruments of urban traffic management which permit this priority:
With this objective in mind, the following measures are among those implemented over the past twenty years: parking and stopping prohibited in 17 road sections. 41 bans on left turns in roads with tram routes. 72 "Give way" signs at intersections in roads carrying bus and tram traffic. 21 km of bus lanes. About 40 building projects, such as islands for bus and tram stops, separate tracks, pedestrian zones with trams and buses, multi-track systems, bus lanes, etc. 2 newly constructed sections for extending a tram line by 2 and 6.4 km, respectively, with a separate track throughout.
Modern urban traffic management requires not only clear priorities in the allocation of the available traffic areas but also modern operating systems which manage these areas and always maintain them in a state which permits maximum movement. A novel traffic light operating system is of key importance (Figure 10).
Conventional traffic light controllers serve two purposes: traffic safety and optimisation of the efficiency of an individual junction or of a group of junctions combined to form a green zone. If the traffic light operating system is to fulfil the objectives of urban traffic management, the following requirements also apply:
Unfortunately, such an operating system cannot be simply bought, set up and left to function by itself. Industry offers no such controls at this time. They have to be developed afresh for every city, set up step-by-step and then operated.
A very decisive factor is that one body in the city should be responsible for the entire operating system, including the fixed road signals and signs: planning, design, construction and operation are so closely intertwined that a permanent group - in Zurich there are 22 people, including 6 programmers - must be employed. The traffic light operating system set up in Zurich meets the requirements described to a high degree. It is very clearly superior to traffic light operating systems conventionally installed. Although the same traffic lights are present in the roads, they switch on the basis of more wide-ranging objectives and more complex, refined technology and with a result which is evidently different.
The second modern operating system is a high-quality management instrument with which the Traffic Manager can talk to every driver and to the passengers in every tram and every bus (Figure 14). The master computer of this system knows where these are located to an accuracy of 10 m. However, all the timetables are stored in the system, so that it is always clear whether a vehicle is travelling according to the timetable or, if not, how great the difference in the timetable is. The comparison of the actual and ideal situations is communicated continuously to every driver in his vehicle. He is therefore able to monitor himself. Conformity to the timetable and hence regularity can thus be considerably improved (Figure 15).
The tram- and bus-operation control system permits efficient fault management. The control centre has two manned, central positioned trams and five buses distributed over the network and can use these to replace a late or missing vehicle in the correct position in the timetable. Where sections are blocked by accidents, processions, demonstrations, etc., the control centre orders diversions and - if required - organises operation with extra buses as a replacement. In addition, the police, ambulances and technical assistants can be summoned very quickly when required. The aim of all measures is to eliminate faults rapidly and to limit their effects so that as few uninvolved people as possible have to suffer from them. The information provided for the passengers in the vehicles and at the most important stops of the Züri-Linie over loudspeakers connected to the control centre should not be forgotten.
In order to be able to maintain continuous operation of the tram network when sections are blocked or during authorised processions in the inner cities, some additional service tracks, i.e. branching facilities, diversion sections and turning loops, were constructed. Thus, operations control is flexible and can also order diversions for the tram network.
With the tram- and bus-operation control system, the journeys by the vehicles can be stored and can be described in terms of certain evaluation criteria. These serve, for example, as a basis for the timetable or for evaluating trouble spots. Investigations of the situations before and afterwards show the effectiveness of improvement measures of a constructional or organisational type. The line and travel time files are also used for the timetable generation program, the results of which in turn form the basis of the service plan generation program and the service plan disposition and salary bonus program.
With regard to urban transport policy, economy and ecology are by no means contradictory. Zurich is living proof of the fact that a transport policy which promotes public transport at the expense of private motor transport results in considerable economic development of the city.
The urban transport policy must provide optimal conditions for the development of the economy. It is vital to ensure accessibility for employees and visitors in sufficient numbers and under attractive conditions and to enable freight transport to be conducted economically. Whether the visitors come by car or by public transport is unimportant for the economic development of the city; a decisive factor is that they come and are restricted as little as possible in their freedom of movement. Unfortunately, it has been found again and again that private motor traffic has a tendency to stifle itself. If its volume is not stabilised at a level which corresponds to the efficiency of the urban road network (cf. washing machine) , the result is congestion, and accessibility is no longer guaranteed.
The transport policy must also ensure that, when providing mobility, the negative effects on the environment do not exceed a tolerance level. Ecology in its widest sense means an environment worth living in, an environment that brings joy to the majority of those affected and in particular does not make them ill.
Unfortunately, private motor transport is rapidly reaching the limit of tolerability from this point of view too. Although certain adverse side effects can be suppressed by technical measures, for example NOX emission by means of catalysts, however atmospheric pollution, noise, the danger of accidents, etc. are unacceptable for the environment in the case of a major proportion of private motor traffic.
The transport policy chosen in Zurich by the citizens themselves is clearly more advantageous from the points of view of ecology, quality of life and leisure time value. The greater the number of passenger journeys combined into large vehicles of the local public transport system the lower the risk of accidents, the less space required and the lower the level of emissions, and the higher the quality of the environment and the quality of life and of leisure time in the city. Less private motor traffic with the same or better accessibility means:
From economic points of view, it is first necessary to consider the benefit of mobility. There is no doubt that benefits can be obtained from an increase in mobility. It is just as clear that this increase gives rise to costs. Figure 16 shows how benefits and expenditure change with an increase in mobility: the benefits initially increase sharply and subsequently level off. The expenditure shows the opposite behaviour: the initial increase in mobility costs little whereas further increases require higher and higher expenditure. If the two curves are superposed, it is evident that there is a region in which the cost/benefit ratio is optimal. To illustrate the cost/benefit ratio, three different approaches are shown in which initially the benefits in terms of the number of people transported are compared with the costs in money. Figure 17 shows that the cost/benefit ratio - expressed in francs per person per hour - is about six times more advantageous for an underground railway and almost ten times more favourable for a tram system on a separate route than the corresponding ratio for an urban motorway.
Figure 18 shows that the cost/benefit ratio for the development measures is eight times more advantageous for trams and buses and four to five times more favourable for the suburban railway than for the urban motorway network. In Figure 19, it is assumed that all eight cities compared had the same conditions about 20 years ago: historic city centre, increasing concentration of jobs in the city centre and private traffic reaching the limits. All eight cities had a well developed tram network and had the same aim, which they have since achieved: the creation of an attractive reliable local public transport system. The three largest cities, Munich, Stockholm and Vienna, constructed underground railways, which was unavoidable in view of the large numbers of passengers to be transported. Four cities constructed light rail systems, which are comparable to tram systems in their transportation capacity but travel in tunnels in the city centres and leave the traffic space in the inner city road free for private motor traffic. The existing tram networks were removed. Zurich remained loyal to the tram and gave it priority in the allocation of the road area and in the operation of the traffic lights (and did the same for buses).
Even with all the problems of this comparison, it is quite clear that the investments in local public transport in Zurich have resulted in an excellent cost/benefit ratio with comparable quality of service: 4 - 11 times better, based on the passengers, and 2 - 6 times better, based on the residents, than in the case of the cities compared.
Economic data provide a valid answer to the question as to whether the transport policy is successful. And - surprisingly? - this answer is extremely positive for the City of Zurich. The economic strength of this city is unaffected.
The fact that it is necessary to set limits to the free market economy in urban traffic and that the "free" car traffic destroys not only one's own freedom but also the quality of the environment and the economy are not new discoveries. Not so well known was the fact that, when backed up by the necessary political will and modern technology, the good old tram is a very up-to-date means of public transport which is very particularly valued by the passengers.
The Zurich model of an economic, environment-friendly transport policy proves that the redistribution of road areas and of green time at traffic lights in favour of trams, buses and pedestrians is not only an aesthetic idealistic aim but also a well-founded materialistic objective of a modern urban transport policy.
Updated 20 March 2000
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